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| A Key Recovery Attack on Fully Homomorphic Encryption Scheme |
| Guang Yan①② Zhu Yue-fei① Gu Chun-xiang①② Zheng Yong-hui①② Tang Quan-you①② |
①(PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450002, China)
②(State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing, Zhengzhou 450002, China) |
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Abstract Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) makes it possible to perform all sorts of calculation in cipher domain, and own great value in cloud computing. However, the security of existing FHE schemes under the non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks remains an issue to be studied. In this paper the construction of the Learning With Errors-based FHE scheme is analyzed, and it is pointed out that this cryptosystem has a potential security flaw, which creates the risk of private key leakage when confronting non-adaptive chosen cipher attacks. According to this, a key recovery attack is proposed, which is capable of recovering the private keys of such cryptosystem with the help of decryption oracle, through blending the dichotomy approximation in cipher domain and the solution of linear congruent equations.
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Received: 12 March 2013
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Corresponding Authors:
Guang Yan
E-mail: gyinarmy@126.com
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2013, Vol. 35 
