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| Cryptanalysis of a Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol |
| Hu Xue-Xian①② Wei Jiang-hong① Ye Mao① |
①(PLA Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450002, China)
②(Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China) |
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Abstract In the 15th (2012) IACR international conference on practice and theory of Public-Key Cryptography (PKC), Fujioka et al. proposed a generic construction of Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) from a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), which is called the GC protocol and is proven to be secure in the CK+ security model. In this paper, it is pointed out by cryptanalysis that the GC protocol is not CK+ secure. Concrete attacks in which the outside adversary, without knowing the static or ephemeral keys of the users, imitates a valid user are also given. Further, the errors in the original security proof are analyzed.
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Received: 26 October 2012
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Corresponding Authors:
Hu Xue-Xian
E-mail: xuexian_hu@yahoo.com.cn
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2013, Vol. 35 
