On the Defense Advantages of Network Address Shuffling Against Different Scanning Attacks
WANG Kai①② CHEN Xinhua③ CHEN Xi②④ Wu Zehui②
①(School of Electrical and Information Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China) ②(Institute of Cyberspace Security, PLA Strategic Support Force Information Engineering University, Zhengzhou 450000, China) ③(Department of Computer, Zhengzhou Preschool Education College, Zhengzhou 450000, China) ④(State Key Laboratory of Mathematical Engineering and Advanced Computing, Wuxi 214125, China)
Abstract：Network address shuffling invalidates the address information collected by the attacker with dynamically changing or remapping the host’s network addresses, however, the defense performance of network address shuffling decreases when against scanning attacks which launch attacks at the same time of discovering targets, and few studies analyze theoretically different defense advantages of network address shuffling against scanning attacks of different scanning strategies. In this paper, two strategies of network address shuffling are considered: uniform shuffling and non-repeat shuffling. It presents probabilistic models of scanning attacks in the static address and network address shuffling environments, which analyzes both the probability of the attacker hitting at least one host and the number of hosts hit by the attacker. Then, the defense advantages of both network address shuffling strategies are theoretically calculated and compared with the static address environment. Analysis results indicate that both shuffling strategies have no defense advantages against repeatable scanning attack compared with the static address environment; uniform shuffling has probability advantage against non-repeat scanning attack only when the hosts number is small, and non-repeat shuffling has significant ratio advantage only when the hosts number accounts for a small proportion in the network space size.
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