Game Theoretic Analysis for the Feature of Mimicry Honeypot
Shi Le-yi① Jiang Lan-lan① Liu Xin① Jia Chun-fu②
①(College of Computer and Communication Engineering, China University of Petroleum, Qingdao 266555, China) ②(College of Information Technical Science, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China)
Abstract：This paper firstly gives the formalization description of both players’ strategies and payoffs in the mimicry honeypot game, and constructs the payoff matrix of the fraudulent game using non-cooperative and incomplete dynamic game theory. Then the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium conditions are inferred. The equilibrium conditions and relative factors are discussed in detail, and the comparison to traditional honeypot is also performed. The theoretic analysis depicts the effective condition for protective coloration and warning coloration mechanism in the fraudulent game, and demonstrates that the mimicry honeypot has better activeness, efficiency and fraudulence than the traditional scheme.
石乐义, 姜蓝蓝, 刘昕, 贾春福. 拟态式蜜罐诱骗特性的博弈理论分析[J]. 电子与信息学报, 2013, 35(5): 1063-1068.
Shi Le-Yi, Jiang Lan-Lan, Liu Xin, Jia Chun-Fu. Game Theoretic Analysis for the Feature of Mimicry Honeypot. , 2013, 35(5): 1063-1068.
2013, Vol. 35 
